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EMPATHY AND ARTICLE III: JUDGE WEINSTEIN,
CASES AND CONTROVERSIES
Susan A. Bandes*
It seems to me that every person appearing before the judge is a
human being and entitled to be treated with dignity, and that often
requires that we speak face-to-face and try to . . . appreciate that we
have a human being before us.1
The aspect of humanity, of the human spirit, and of the empathy we
feel for our fellow men and women . . . is the gate to justice that gives
life and reason to our work as lawyers and judges.2
The purpose of rules is to enable judges to resist the emotionally en-
gaging temptation to relieve the plight of those they can see and em-
pathize with, even when doing so would be unfair to those they
cannot see.3
This celebration of the life and achievements of Judge Weinstein
presents an ideal opportunity to investigate a question that has gener-
ated substantial controversy lately: the role of empathy in judging.  It
also presents an ideal opportunity to productively focus and narrow
the empathy debate.  Problematically, the empathy debate generally
treats judging as a monolithic concept.  To debate whether empathy is
a desirable attribute of judges as a general matter is to overlook im-
portant distinctions between trial, appellate, and Supreme Court ju-
rists, and between federal and state courts.  Using Judge Weinstein’s
approach to judging as a touchstone, I will explore the role of empa-
thy for Article III judges, and for federal district court judges in
particular.
* Centennial Distinguished Professor, DePaul University College of Law.
1. Kenneth P. Nolan, Weinstein on the Courts, LITIG., Spring 1992, at 24, 26 (quoting from an
interview with Jack B. Weinstein); see also JEFFREY B. MORRIS, LEADERSHIP ON THE FEDERAL
BENCH: THE CRAFT AND ACTIVISM OF JACK WEINSTEIN 101 (2011) (quoting the same).
2. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 311 (quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Speech at Temple Emanuel,
Great Neck, N.Y.: Maimonides’ Tempering of a Justice Too Rigid and Cruel for Humanity 6
(Aug. 6, 1999)).
3. John Hasnas, The “Unseen” Deserve Empathy, Too, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2009, at A15.
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I. CASES, CONTROVERSIES, AND JUDICIAL EMPATHY
The question of whether judges ought to be empathetic has been
hotly debated in recent years.4  This debate arises mainly from a
broader controversy about the proper nature of the judicial role, but it
is complicated by a lack of shared understanding of the meaning of
the term “empathy.”5  I will address this definitional problem at the
outset. I will then turn to the underlying jurisprudential issue of
whether empathy is a desirable attribute for judges, and for federal
district court judges in particular.  There is no better focus for such an
inquiry than Judge Weinstein.
The term “empathy” is something of a moving target—it has been
used variously to mean cognitive understanding, affective engage-
ment, compassion, and moral imagination.6  Empathy, in each of these
incarnations, is a cornerstone of Judge Weinstein’s judging.7  But each
of these meanings raises a complex set of questions about the proper
scope and goals of Article III judicial power.
Judge Weinstein has a strong vision of the role of the federal
courts—one that places primacy on realizing the postwar goal of equal
access to justice.  As I will discuss, he views exposing and righting in-
justice as a court’s affirmative duty rather than its passive role.  His
vision emphasizes not only access to courts, but also the importance of
the appearance of justice.  He talks often about the law’s human
face—about communicating to litigants that they have the attention
and understanding of the court.  His judicial philosophy places great
weight on the responsibility of the judge to seek out a broad under-
standing not only of the litigants’ situations, but also of the societal
context in which their cases arise.  He says quite movingly: “Were it
possible, judges would want to crawl into the skin of society, acquiring
all knowledge and understanding all feelings. . . . Judges cannot make
accurate findings of fact or evaluate the effect of their decisions unless
they have some understanding of society.”8  As is well known, Judge
4. For a discussion, see Susan A. Bandes, Empathetic Judging and the Rule of Law, 2009 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 133, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1431230.
5. Psychologist C. Daniel Batson observed: “The term empathy is currently applied to more
than a half-dozen phenomena. . . . Opportunities for disagreement abound.”  C. Daniel Batson,
These Things Called Empathy: Eight Related but Distinct Phenomena, in THE SOCIAL NEUROS-
CIENCE OF EMPATHY 3 (Jean Decety & William Ickes eds., 2009).
6. See id.; see also CANDACE CLARK, MISERY AND COMPANY: SYMPATHY IN EVERYDAY LIFE
34 (1997).
7. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Courtroom as Classroom: Independence, Imagination, and
Ideology in the Work of Jack Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1971, 2004–06 (1997).
8. Jack B. Weinstein, Learning, Speaking, and Acting: What Are the Limits for Judges?, 77
JUDICATURE 322, 322–23 (1994).
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Weinstein places great stock in site visits, remarking that he finds it
“easier to understand what is at stake” when he can “see and hear the
real people concerned in their own settings.”9  Relatedly, his vision for
the role of the federal district courts encompasses not just the parties
before the court, but the best interests and general welfare of the
larger community.
In this brief summary, one can identify the whole range of attributes
I mentioned above: cognitive empathy, affective empathy, compas-
sion, and moral imagination.  Some or all of these judicial attributes
are the subject of controversy, as are several aspects of Judge Wein-
stein’s approach.  The first step is to establish working definitions of
the psychological terms.  The next step is to examine these attributes
in light of the requisites of Article III.
II. PINNING DOWN THE ELUSIVE NOTION OF “EMPATHY”
There is no agreed-upon definition of empathy.  It is a term that has
been assigned various meanings throughout history, and in different
cultures, and across disciplines, and even within disciplines, and in ref-
erence to humans as opposed to other species.10  C. Daniel Batson, a
leading cognitive scientist studying empathy, recently identified eight
distinct phenomena that are called “empathy” in his field alone.11  The
only way to conduct a coherent conversation about the role of empa-
thy is to state one’s working definition at the outset.
My working definition of empathy is: the ability “to imagine oneself
in the other’s situation and to experience, to some degree, the emo-
tions that the other is experiencing.”12  This definition centers on the
effort to understand the internal state of another and leaves to one
side, for the time being, the question of motivation to respond to the
needs or desires of another.  Empathy thus is a capacity, not an emo-
tion.  It is a capacity that does not necessarily lead to actions in favor
of its object, and indeed it need not be exercised exclusively toward
one person.  At first blush, empathy so defined appears purely cogni-
tive.  But the definition of empathy as a cognitive capacity fails to cap-
ture some essential affective dimensions.  One of these is the will to
9. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF
CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 99 (1995).
10. See, e.g., THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF EMPATHY: EXPERIENCING THE LIVES OF OTHERS IN
PACIFIC SOCIETIES (Douglas W. Hollan and C. Jason Throop eds., 2011) (discussing variations in
empathy among various Pacific societies).  For a fuller discussion of the definitions of empathy,
see Bandes, supra note 4.
11. Batson, supra note 5.
12. Raymond S. Nickerson et al., Empathy and Knowledge Projection, in THE SOCIAL
NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY, supra note 5, at 43.
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exercise it.  As discussed below, some empathy is virtually automatic,
but much of it is effortful.  It requires the humility to understand that
one’s own perspective is limited, and the curiosity and drive to under-
stand the perspective of others.  Additionally, the ability to under-
stand the needs and desires of others can be a coldly clinical and
purely instrumental capacity. Psychopaths may have this sort of in-
sight, but it is unaccompanied by care or concern.  Some psychologists
call this “cognitive empathy” and distinguish it from the “emotional
empathy” that psychopaths lack: a state in which one is motivated to
understand and even share the feelings of others by concern, rather
than simply cold or instrumental curiosity.13
Although empathy so defined has affective elements, it is important
to distinguish it from sympathy or compassion.  The line between af-
fective empathy and sympathy is not always easy to draw, but the im-
portant distinguishing factor is that different capacities or emotions
are associated with different tendencies toward action (or inaction).
The recent empathy debates were clouded by a failure to make this
distinction.  For example, during the confirmation hearings of Justices
Sotomayor and Kagan, several scholars and jurists expressed concern
that empathetic judges could not remain unbiased and therefore could
not uphold the rule of law.14  This concern was grounded in confusion
between empathy and sympathy or compassion. Sympathy and com-
passion are emotions; they entail feeling for someone, rather than sim-
ply understanding his or her feelings.  Unlike empathy, sympathy and
compassion are usually accompanied by an action tendency: a desire
to act to relieve the object’s suffering.  Judge Weinstein has well ar-
ticulated this distinction and its implications for judging.  He ob-
served, for example: “Sympathy for the poor or well-to-do must not
affect substantive results.  But empathy is not forbidden: it allows the
court to better understand the positions of the parties.”15  Under-
standing what is at stake for the parties does not, without more, lead
to sympathy for the parties, or to actions on behalf of one party or
another.  Conversely, sympathy and compassion can exist without em-
pathy—these feelings may rest on misconceptions about the object’s
thoughts and desires.
13. See R. J. R. Blair & Karina S. Blair, Empathy, Morality, and Social Convention: Evidence
from the Study of Psychopathy and Other Psychiatric Disorders, in THE SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE
OF EMPATHY, supra note 5, at 139, 142–44.
14. For a discussion, see Bandes, supra note 4.
15. Jack B. Weinstein, Essay, The Roles of a Federal District Court Judge, 76 BROOK. L. REV.
439, 440 (2011).
2015] EMPATHY AND ARTICLE III 321
The other misconception that has misinformed the empathy debate
is that judicial empathy is a quality that runs only toward marginalized
or disadvantaged litigants.16  There are several reasons why judicial
empathy is so often erroneously viewed as an emotion aimed exclu-
sively at the disadvantaged and the powerless.  One is that it is con-
flated with compassion and sympathy, as discussed above.
Compassion and sympathy are emotions that are commonly directed
toward the less fortunate.  Empathy, on the other hand, is an effort to
stand in the shoes of another—wherever that other is situated.17
Another source of the confusion is that we mistake empathy for
something that needs to be effortful and visible.  In fact, our ability to
understand the intentions and motivations of others is one of the most
basic capacities of social life; it is pervasive and often not particularly
noticeable.  It comes easily and naturally when its objects share our
assumptions, values, and life experiences.  Without effort on our part,
our empathy will tend to flow toward those like us.18  Problematically,
we are likely to be unaware of this bias because it seems so natural
and effortless.  Empathy for those from shared backgrounds, who
hold shared values, is so ingrained in the fabric of the judiciary that it
is misidentified as empathy-free judging, when it is in fact a selective
empathy that tends to privilege the powerful.  For the observer, the
only noticeable judicial empathy may be the self-conscious imagina-
tive effort to bridge divides—including divides of class, race, and
ethnicity—in order to grasp the stakes for all the litigants.  As Mary
Anne Franks well put it,
Empathy forces us to imagine and to have concern for those who
are radically different from, even threatening to, ourselves and our
values. . . .
The primary value of empathy is that it tells us not to assume that
we are right, or objective, or impartial.  It opens up a window of
humility that can help guide a decision-maker to the correct
outcome.19
As Judge Alex Kozinski noted, “[N]o truly poor people are appointed
as federal judges, or as state judges for that matter. . . . The everyday
problems of people who live in poverty are not close to our hearts and
16. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Opinion, Obama’s “Redistribution” Constitution, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 28, 2008, at A17; Hasnas, supra note 3.
17. Indeed, studies show that in comparison to other groups, the privileged and powerful are
quite sparing with their empathy for those in less favored circumstances. See, e.g., Daniel
Goleman, Rich People Just Care Less, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2013, at 12.
18. See Nickerson et al., supra note 12, at 44–45.
19. Mary Anne Franks, Lies, Damned Lies, and Judicial Empathy, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 61, 69
(2011).
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minds because that’s not how we and our friends live.”20  The miscon-
ception that empathy flows only toward marginalized or powerless liti-
gants masks and insulates from scrutiny the sort of selective empathy
for powerful corporate or governmental litigants that is so deeply in-
grained in the halls of power—including courts—that it is nearly
invisible.21
In the recent empathy contretemps, this hardy misconception can
be traced in part to a misinterpretation of then-Presidential candidate
Barack Obama’s comment during a speech at Planned Parenthood
that he wanted to appoint judges with “the heart [and] . . . the empa-
thy to recognize what it’s like to be a young teenage mom[,] . . . to
understand what it’s like to be poor or African-American or gay or
disabled or old.”22  Although President Obama later backed away
from this comment, it is important to consider it more carefully.
The firestorm elicited by this comment was fueled by the perception
that President Obama was calling for judges to precommit to favoring
certain categories of litigants in the cases before them.23  In fact, there
is an important distinction between exercising bias toward particular
litigants or types of litigants, which is of course improper, and articu-
lating a philosophy about the proper role of the federal courts. View-
ing the President’s remark in the context of the speech to Planned
Parenthood, its import was clear.  It was not a call to insert empathy
where none had existed before. It was a declaration that the current
Supreme Court was too one-sided in its empathy.  More than that, it
was an expression of a vision of the role of the federal courts—a vi-
sion different from the one guiding the current Court, and one very
similar to Judge Weinstein’s:
Part of the role of the Court is that it is going to protect people who
may be vulnerable in the political process, the outsider, the minor-
ity, those who are vulnerable, those who don’t have a lot of
clout. . . . If we can find people who have life experience and they
understand what it means to be on the outside . . . that’s the kind of
person I want on the Supreme Court.24
20. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting).
21. See Bandes, supra note 14, at 141.
22. William Safire, Zombie Banks, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2009, at 26 (quoting Senator Barack
Obama, Campaign Speech to Planned Parenthood (July 17, 2007)); see also Bandes, supra note
14, at 135 (quoting the same).
23. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 16, at A17; Bandes, supra note 14, at 146–48.
24. Senator Barack Obama, Democratic Presidential Debate in Las Vegas, Nev. (Nov. 15,
2007), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/15/us/politics/15debate-transcript.html; see
also Bandes, supra note 14, at 146–48 (discussing then-Senator Barack Obama’s statement about
his criteria for making judicial appointments).
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There are those who regard the notion of a judicial philosophy as
itself improper, but this stance is fueled by the misconception that ju-
rists who do not articulate a philosophy are operating in a neutral,
ideology-free zone.  Thus, for example, Judge Shira Scheindlin’s neu-
trality was questioned when she called attention to the pro-govern-
ment bias of many judges and stated that she was unafraid to rule
against the government, while those judges who rule consistently but
quietly for governmental and corporate interests are assumed to be
neutral and nonideological.25  As I have argued elsewhere, judicial
candidates and judges have little incentive to acknowledge that they
have interpretive leeway, and that this leeway permits value judg-
ments.26  Those who do acknowledge this reality27 are labeled activist,
partisan, and political, while those who claim law is mechanical and
inexorable are regarded as neutral and nonpartisan.28  It is no mystery
what camp Judge Weinstein belongs in.  As Jeffrey Morris observed,
“Much of what has made [Judge] Weinstein so controversial is his un-
abashed willingness to admit that judges do make law and the ways he
finds to do so.”29
This willingness to admit the possibility of choice and change is a
precondition for the final attribute of empathy: moral imagination.
Certainly, there is no agreed-upon definition for this term, but it cap-
tures a set of qualities that are essential to understanding Judge Wein-
stein’s jurisprudence.  It describes an ability to understand the range
of values at stake and the possibilities for change inherent in the situa-
tion.  Moral imagination permits one to see that things might be or-
dered differently.30  Paul Lederach describes it as a quality that
“breaks out of what appear to be narrow, shortsighted, or structurally
determined dead ends.”31
25. Jeffrey Toobin, The Preposterous Removal of Judge Scheindlin, NEW YORKER (Oct. 31,
2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-preposterous-removal-of-judge-scheind
lin; see also Bandes, supra note 14, at 139–41 (discussing the consistently pro-corporate and pro-
government voting record of Chief Justice John Roberts).
26. Susan A. Bandes, We Lost It at the Movies: The Rule of Law Goes from Washington to
Hollywood and Back Again, 40 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 621 (2007).
27. See Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 295–308 (2005)
(critiquing the common misconception that district court judges do not make law); see also Jer-
emy Waldron, How Judges Should Judge, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 10, 2006, at 54 (reviewing
RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES (2006), and noting that even when applying precedent,
judges must make value judgments).
28. Bandes, supra note 26, at 637–38.
29. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 114.
30. Susan A. Bandes, Moral Imagination in Judging, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 24 (2011).
31. JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, THE MORAL IMAGINATION: THE ART AND SOUL OF BUILDING
PEACE 27 (2005).
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The question, then, is to what extent these attributes, all so central
to Judge Weinstein’s jurisprudence, are in harmony with the goals and
limits of Article III district court judging.  A logical starting place for
this inquiry is to consider this question: what tools and attributes do
Article III judges need in order to adjudicate effectively and justly?
III. CASES OF A “JUDICIARY NATURE”
Modern justiciability doctrine seeks to delineate the reach of the
federal courts by demanding that cases possess certain requisites: a
distinct and palpable injury that the court is able to remedy, concrete
facts to inform the court of the real consequences of its decision, and
adverse parties who will define the issues sharply and argue them zeal-
ously.32  These purportedly neutral principles cannot be applied in an
ideological vacuum.  They are instrumental attributes, meant to en-
sure that the courts can perform their role—and thus, applying these
criteria requires a vision of the role of the federal courts.33  The core
debate about the role of the federal courts is usually described as a
tension between a “private rights” approach in which the court’s role
is simply to adjudicate the claims of the litigants who seek its jurisdic-
tion, and a “public rights” approach in which the court plays a more
active role in policing the political branches and creating norms that
reach well beyond the litigants to affect absentees and communities.34
There is rich and voluminous scholarly literature on this general
topic,35 but it suffers from a serious though unsurprising omission. Jus-
ticiability doctrine purports to be about what judges need in order to
decide cases, and thus it appears to be, in part, a claim about the req-
uisites of good decision making.  Yet the highly abstract discourse
about justiciability never focuses on the actual dynamics of decision
making. It says nothing about how actual judges discover what is at
stake for actual litigants (or for others who stand to be affected by
judicial action).  For example, the black letter doctrine tells us that
zealous, adverse litigants with a personal stake in the controversy are
the best guarantee of a well-presented case.36  That is, these are instru-
mental criteria, meant to ensure that judges are within their zone of
competence and have the tools for good decision making.
32. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 583 (1992).
33. See Susan A. Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227 (1990).
34. See infra Part V (discussing the interests of absentees).
35. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 33; Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public
Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432 (1988); Mark V. Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response
to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698 (1980).
36. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 770 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
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For a person unschooled in the arid formalism of federal courts doc-
trine, these criteria might appear to have an affective dimension.  Why
the requirement for zealous and adverse advocates?  Is the assump-
tion that the litigants’ emotional investment in their claims will assist
the judge’s understanding?  That it will lead to an enthusiasm that
helps sharpen and clarify the issues?  These criteria almost hint at a
curiosity about the motivations and states of mind of litigants, and the
cognitive and affective dynamics of judging.  But in fact, Article III
doctrine regards concreteness, adversity, zealousness, and personal
stake as “bare bones” criteria that can be evaluated from the plead-
ings—a telling term for a set of disembodied characteristics.  Article
III scholarship proceeds largely along the same bloodless lines.
The lack of attention to the actual requisites of decision making to
delineate the realm of competency of federal courts becomes even
more problematic when one considers the special role of federal dis-
trict courts.  Federal district courts provide the primary, or perhaps
the sole, opportunity for personal interaction between federal litigants
and the judges who will decide their cases.  Empathetic engagement in
this context plays an essential role: it both informs the judge and reas-
sures the litigant.
District courts (and juries) are uniquely charged with evaluating the
actual litigants’ demeanor and behavior, as well as the demeanor and
behavior of witnesses.37 They are uniquely positioned to distill facts
from context.  They are uniquely afforded the opportunity to observe
and talk to the litigants themselves.  They alone offer the curious
judge an opportunity to “see and hear the real people concerned in
their own setting[ ]”38 via site visits or other fact-finding vehicles.  In
short, district courts offer unique opportunities for empathetic en-
gagement by judges, imposing unique responsibilities on them.  As
Judge Weinstein observes: “The psychological and emotional distance
between the judge and those who are in court must not be allowed to
become too great.”39  This is, quite obviously, not a description of
purely cognitive empathy.  As is often true, one cannot improve on
Judge Weinstein’s own words.  As he put it, this is the kind of empathy
that helps to “open the gate between the head of the law and the
hearts of those who seek justice from us.”40
37. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, there is increasing evidence that eye con-
tact and the ability to read facial expression aid in empathetic engagement. See, e.g., Jonathan
Cole, Empathy Needs a Face, 8 J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUD., nos. 5–7, 2001, at 51.
38. WEINSTEIN, supra note 9, at 99.
39. Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the People: Notes
for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 226 (2008).
40. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 311 (quoting Weinstein, supra note 2, at 6).
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Interestingly, the standard discourse on judicial empathy centers ex-
clusively on whether empathy is a useful attribute for judges.  It misses
the other dimension of empathy: its effect on the person to whom it is
directed.  Empathy is not merely an exercise in understanding for the
person who exercises it.  It is a means of communicating interest and
concern to the recipient.  The district courts are, as Judge Weinstein
has observed, the “human face”41 of the law for the litigants.  In Jus-
tice Breyer’s words: “A federal courtroom . . . is a public office in
which a citizen meets face-to-face a high government official ap-
pointed by the President, ready to devote the time and effort needed
to solve his or her particular legal problem.”42  When Judge Weinstein
says that “every person appearing before the judge is a human being
and entitled to be treated with dignity, and that often requires that we
speak face-to-face and try to . . . appreciate that we have a human
being before us,”43 he is emphasizing the importance of judicial empa-
thy not just for the judge, but for the litigant as well.
Assuming that empathy consists of a concern for others and a desire
to understand their perspectives, coupled with humility about one’s
own limited perspective, judicial empathy toward litigants appears to
fit squarely within even the narrowest conception of the role of Arti-
cle III judges.  Judge Weinstein’s legendary struggles with the federal
sentencing guidelines44 highlight the use of judicial empathy while
raising some difficult questions about the limits of the judicial role.
His sentencing hearings reflect a desire for concrete facts to aid his
understanding of the range of consequences for the individual defend-
ants who stand before him.  The hearings reflect his awareness that it
is in the district court that the defendant’s humanity is most salient.
As he observed,
The defendant’s words, his facial expressions and body language,
the severity of an infirmity, the depth of his family’s reliance, or the
feebleness of his build cannot be accurately conveyed by a cold re-
cord. Many defendants are ill educated and inarticulate. They do
not have the intellectual capacity to articulate, as might a great nov-
elist, what is in their hearts. They are, after all, mere people.45
41. Id. at 97.
42. Stephen Breyer, Tribute to the Honorable Jack Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1947, 1948
(1997).
43. Nolan, supra note 1, at 26.
44. See, e.g., MORRIS, supra note 1, at 243–80.
45. In re Sentencing, 219 F.R.D. 262, 264 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
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The recent case of United States v. Reingold46 offers an excellent
example of the steps Judge Weinstein takes to grasp the concrete con-
text and the possible consequences of his decisions.  In that case, he
authorized a downward departure from the federal sentencing guide-
lines for a defendant who pled guilty to distributing child pornography
as an adolescent.47  In determining the appropriate sentence, he heard
from experts on the pathology at issue and the range and efficacy of
available treatments.48  He considered the defendant’s actions while
awaiting sentence, as well as expert testimony on his likelihood of re-
cidivism.49  Most notably, Judge Weinstein conducted a site visit to a
facility for the treatment of individuals who had viewed child pornog-
raphy in order to determine the optimal length of a stay.50
In one sense, the judge’s obligation to sentence reflects the most
traditional, core conception of the trial court’s role.  As Judge Wein-
stein observed, “An important duty of an Article III district judge is to
prevent injustices by the government in individual cases.”51  Sentenc-
ing requires a narrow determination grounded in concrete facts, and
an awareness of the consequences for both the defendant and the
larger community in which his crime took place—and to which he will
return.  Yet each sentence unfolds in a broader administrative context,
in which consistency, predictability, proportionality, and other values
are at stake.  The federal sentencing guidelines put these values front
and center in a way that Judge Weinstein and many of his colleagues
believe interferes with their core judicial duty to individual defend-
ants.52  Sometimes this conflict led the Judge to hand down sentences
that violated the guidelines, accompanied by opinions articulately ex-
pressing his grounds for objection to the guidelines.53  This strategy
will be discussed below in the section on moral imagination.
46. United States v. C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 343 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), vacated and remanded  sub
nom. United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2013).  In the case, Judge Weinstein refers
to the defendant Reingold, who was a juvenile at the time of the offense, as “C.R.” C.R., 792 F.
Supp. at 347.
47. Id. at 507.
48. Id. at 419.
49. Id. at 419–20.
50. Id. at 349.
51. United States v. C.R., 972 F. Supp. 2d 457, 458 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (memorandum and order
in response to the Second Circuit’s opinion reversing Judge Weinstein’s imposed sentence and
remanding for resentencing).
52. See Jack B. Weinstein, Notes on Uniformity and Individuality in Mass Litigation, 64
DEPAUL L. REV 251, at 255–56 (2015) (arguing that sentencing guidelines for judges to impose
unfair rules, leading to judicial responsibility to expose injustice, and interpret law with
humanity).
53. See, e.g., C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 343.
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IV. EMPATHY FOR THE “UNSEEN”
If empathy for the litigants enables the court to understand and care
about the stakes for those who seek its help, what is the objection to
empathy?  Let us return to the anti-empathy argument quoted
above.54  John Hasnas argues, “The purpose of the rules is to enable
judges to resist the emotionally engaging temptation to relieve the
plight of those they can see and empathize with, even when doing so
would be unfair to those they cannot see.”55  To use the shorthand
employed by Hasnas, empathy for litigants is problematic because it
may preclude or disfavor “empathy for the unseen.”56  Hasnas says,
One can feel for unfortunate homeowners about to lose their
homes through foreclosure.  One cannot feel for unknown individu-
als who may not be able to afford a home in the future if the com-
passionate and empathetic protection of current homeowners
increases the cost of a mortgage.
In general, one can feel compassion for or empathize with indi-
vidual plaintiffs in a lawsuit who are facing hardship.  They are visi-
ble.  One cannot feel compassion for or empathize with impersonal
corporate defendants who . . . will pass the costs on to consumers
. . . .57
In light of the observations above about the importance of face-to-
face interactions and of psychological and emotional engagement be-
tween the judge and the litigants in the courtroom, this concern de-
serves serious consideration.  Is the downside of judicial empathy the
fact that it disadvantages absentees?
Before reaching this question, two problems with Hasnas’ formula-
tion of the question must be addressed.  First, as discussed, it conflates
compassion (which is likely to flow toward the displaced homeowner
rather than the bank) with empathy.  Second, and partly as a result of
the conflation of empathy and compassion, Hasnas also blurs another
distinction important to the discussion of Judge Weinstein’s jurispru-
dence—the distinction between corporate litigants and absentees.
Corporate or governmental defendants may elicit less compassion
than individuals, but corporate or governmental litigants are not “un-
seen.”  They are not invisible or unknown.  The question of how
courts come to understand the concerns of a corporate or governmen-
tal defendant is separate from the question of how judicial empathy
squares with the court’s duty to nonlitigants or the public at large.  So
54. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
55. Hasnas, supra note 3, at A15.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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before turning to the question of absentees, let us consider the con-
nection between empathy and corporate defendants.
In his invaluable book about Judge Weinstein, Jeffrey Morris de-
scribes Judge Weinstein’s approach in a number of cases involving
corporate defendants, including situations involving multiple stake-
holders.58  For example, he describes the litigation over the Shoreham
Nuclear Reactor.59  He draws from Judge Weinstein’s oral history a
vivid account of his site visit to the plant in order to determine its
safety.  During this visit, Judge Weinstein, several jurors, and a court
reporter—all wearing hard hats—crawled through numerous cramped
spaces including boilers, diesel rooms, and safety hatches.60  Weinstein
also took his usual steps to make the harms to the other stakeholders
concrete, including ordering reports on the amount the defendant
could afford to pay to settle, certifying a class of ratepayers, and keep-
ing the political context of the entire dispute well in mind.61  Another
example can be found in an unfair competition suit between Bulova
Watch Co. and K. Hattori & Co.,62 also described by Morris,63 one of
Judge Weinstein’s central tasks was to translate the abstract multina-
tional corporation Hattori into concrete terms by inquiring deeply
into its operations and organizational structure.64  Thus, the abstract
defendant can be made concrete. Its concerns and priorities can be
understood.
If the lack of compassion corporate defendants garner is sometimes
a disadvantage, there is a flip side to this concern.  The complex, dis-
embodied, and  “impersonal” nature of the corporate or governmen-
tal defendant may also have the opposite effect—it may help insulate
the defendant from liability for wrongful acts.65  As I have argued
elsewhere,66 complex organizational defendants are often protected
by their very complexity and their abstract nature.  Just as identifiable
people are more likely to elicit sympathy and compassion than are
abstract entities, abstract entities are less likely to elicit blame.  This is
58. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 341–69.
59. Cnty. of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1487 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 907 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1990).
60. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 234–35.
61. Id. at 230–39.
62. Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
63. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 185.
64. Id. at 185–86.
65. See Susan A. Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REV.
1275 (1999) [hereinafter Bandes, Police Brutality]; see also Susan A. Bandes, Not Enough Blame
To Go Around: Reflections on Requiring Purposeful Government Misconduct, 68 BROOK. L.
REV. 1195 (2003) [hereinafter Bandes, Not Enough Blame].
66. Bandes, Not Enough Blame, supra note 65, at 1197–99.
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a function of our proclivity for tying the concept of blame to humans
with a “soul to damn and a body to kick.”67  We tend to feel more
comfortable casting blame on people with ascertainable bad motives,
rather than locating the responsibility for organizational wrongdoing
that arises from the complex web of actions and inactions of a number
of people.  We prefer to affix blame in situations involving clear links
between wrongdoing and individual, intentional behavior and are un-
comfortable with identifying wrongdoing in situations where responsi-
bility is distributed and diffused.68
The Agent Orange litigation69 was a perfect candidate for this sort
of diffusion of defendant responsibility.  The defendants were indeter-
minate.70  “Because the armed forces mixed defoliants produced by
different companies together before they used them, it was impossible
to attribute a particular injury to a specific company’s product.”71
Moreover, the case involved multiple occurrences of related harm
separated by both time and space.72 The key here is the term related.
The incentive to disaggregate defendant harms and overlook complex
causal connections is strong.  It is the kind of impulse that can lead to
treating an issue like the harm from Agent Orange as just “a product
liability case multiplied many times over.”73  Judge Weinstein’s insis-
tence on viewing the defendants’ actions holistically, rather than as a
series of separate acts by individual actors, permitted the harm to be
addressed.74  He viewed the case through a “wide lens” that enabled
him to address a major social problem afflicting a broad community.
But here is the point that should not be overlooked: the more com-
mon “narrow lens”—the impulse to disaggregate both victims and
wrongdoers and thus obscure and insulate broad social ills—is also
grounded in ideological assumptions about the role of the courts in
society, and about the natural order of things more generally.
67. Edward, First Baron Thurlow, 1731–1806, quoted in John C. Coffee Jr., “No Soul To
Damn: No Body To Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punish-
ment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981).
68. See Bandes, Not Enough Blame, supra note 65; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLEC-
TIONS ON JUDGING 92–93 (2013) (discussing the challenges for judges of apprehending complex-
ity, including interlocking systems and modern technology).
69. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
70. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 324.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 326.
74. Judge Weinstein’s hard-fought preference would have been to view the harm as caused by
the government’s passivity as well as the private actors’ wrongdoing.  Id.
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V. EMPATHY AND ABSENTEES
I now turn to the critique of judicial empathy based on its disadvan-
tage to the interests of nonlitigants—both absentees and those af-
fected more broadly.  One immediate observation about this critique
is that the question of who counts as an absentee and who comes
within the court’s official ambit is, in many respects, within the court’s
own discretion.  A related observation is that the question of who
should be a party to a federal case very much depends on one’s vision
of the role of the federal courts. I made this point earlier in regard to
justiciability doctrine.75  It is equally applicable in regard to the many
means judges have at their disposal for widening or narrowing the
scope of a case, including class certification, intervention, joinder, case
consolidation, and others.  The interpretation of these doctrines is af-
fected by whether one regards a case as a vehicle solely for resolving
binary disputes or a vehicle for articulating norms and resolving im-
portant issues presented by the litigation.76
In addition, Judge Weinstein’s approach is a vivid lesson in the
court’s ability to widen the circle of those who have a say about the
consequences of a ruling.  The hallmark of Judge Weinstein’s jurispru-
dence is his insistence on empathizing with the litigants he can “see,”
as well as those beyond the narrow ambit of the courtroom.  Indeed,
one might say he ensures he can see—and thus empathize—far more
widely than the usual district court judge.  He takes extraordinary
steps to understand the consequences of his rulings for non litigants
and absentees through extensive use of experts, questionnaires, com-
munity-wide hearings, and other “technologies and techniques”77 that
promote extensive participation and debate.  As Martha Minow ob-
served, his complex cases sometimes take the shape of administrative
agencies with a temporary, collapsible structure.78  These efforts are
animated by Judge Weinstein’s underlying philosophy, which includes
a commitment to broad access to the courts and an insistence on con-
sidering legal problems in their broader social context.  This sort of
judicial empathy toward nonlitigants and the public at large leads us
directly to the question of what federal judges are meant to accom-
plish when they decide a case.
75. See supra Part III.
76. See Bandes, supra note 33.
77. Weinstein, supra note 52, at 29.
78. Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary Ad-
ministrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010, 2015 (1997).
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The question Justice Marshall so adroitly finessed in Marbury v.
Madison79 is why the unelected, countermajoritarian federal courts
should have the power to exercise judicial review over the actions of
the democratically elected political branches. His response was that
this broader power was simply a necessary byproduct of the narrow
and uncontroversial power to adjudicate claims of legal rights between
litigants in the court’s jurisdiction.80  This narrow conception of fed-
eral adjudication is premised on the centrality of the claims of the
parties before the court.  As Martin Redish nicely put it, the private
rights model treats the adjudication of delicate and important ques-
tions of constitutional law as if it were no different from the adjudica-
tion of garden-variety contract claims.  The private rights framework
“allows the judiciary to maintain the appearance of non-politiciza-
tion” by casting judicial review as a byproduct of the courts’ tradi-
tional function as “resolvers of disputes among individuals.”81  In this
conception, the judge is charged with understanding the stakes for the
parties.  Of course, the notion of empathy never crops up in descrip-
tions of the private law model, because garden-variety contract and
property claims for material stakes seem to require no inquiry into
individual motivations or desires.
This conception has long existed in tension with a competing public
rights model premised on the federal courts’ “distinct capacity to ex-
plicate and declare public values—norms that transcend individual
controversies.”82  But that broader conception does not erase the
court’s obligation to the individual litigants; it simply views the liti-
gants as the appropriate vehicle for presenting claims whose signifi-
cance often transcend the individual dispute.83
Twentieth-century developments—such as the broad expansion of
constitutional protections and the rise of a complex bureaucratic
state—made it increasingly difficult to separate the federal courts’
narrow case-deciding function from their broader norm-creating func-
tion.84  The increasing anxiety that unelected judges would use the
courts as a forum for imposing their own policy preferences was influ-
79. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
80. Id. at 146–47.
81. MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER: JUDICIAL JURIS-
DICTION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY 92–93 (1991).
82. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 68 (5th ed. 2003).
83. Id. at 70–71.
84. As Judge Weinstein discusses in his remarks, these challenges to the narrow case-deciding
function have become increasingly complex in current times in the face of national and global
economies, mass disasters, and other developments that require court intervention yet defy
traditional jurisdictional boundaries.  Weinstein, supra note 52, at xxx-xx.
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entially addressed by Lea Brilmayer.85  Brilmayer expressed concern
about “ideological plaintiffs” who would push the courts toward “rec-
ognizing community interests apart from the needs of particular peo-
ple” and “exert pressure to participate for the sake of ‘some
undefinable, elusive common good.’”86  She also expressed concern
that absentees and the public would be bound by broad ideological
rulings generated by cases in which they had no chance to partici-
pate.87  For Brilmayer, the way to avoid these outcomes is to interpret
standing to require a material rather than an ideological interest.88
This approach assumes that as long as each individual is permitted to
pursue her own material ends—that is, no general agreement on per-
sonal preferences or values—no “enforced orthodoxy” is required.89
Material interests are assumed to be the best means of motivating liti-
gants to advocate strenuously and present sharply defined issues capa-
ble of judicial resolution.  Moreover, the emphasis on material
interests is assumed to be the best means of keeping judges focused on
the litigants in the dispute before them, rather than wandering into
the thicket of policy making, which will affect absentees and the gen-
eral populace.
In short, the private rights framework regards concern for the inter-
ests of absentees as outside the boundaries of Article III decision
making.  It also regards broad ideological rulings as an incursion on
the future rights of absentees to litigate their own cases. In this ac-
count, absentee interests are safeguarded by keeping cases narrowly
focused on the litigants at bar.  The private rights model is therefore a
strange bedfellow to the ascendant model of—as Robin West recently
called it—“scientific judging.”  As West describes,
There has been a transformation of that on which judges should rely
in reaching their decisions, from rules laid down in the past to pre-
sent understandings of future well-being, from precedent to social
policy, from reliance on analogical reasoning based on past cases to
economic or sociological reasoning based on welfare baselines.90
The irony is that the private rights approach described by Brilmayer is
premised on the primacy of the litigant, while the scientific judging
85. See Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the “Case or Contro-
versy” Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979).
86. Bandes, supra note 33, at 286 (quoting Brilmayer, supra note 85, at 313).
87. R. L. Brilmayer, Judicial Review, Justiciability and the Limits of the Common Law
Method, 57 B.U. L. REV. 807, 823–24 (1977).
88. Id. at 824; see also Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1739 (1975), discussed in Bandes, supra note 33, at 286 n.404.
89. Stewart, supra note 88, at 1739, discussed in Bandes, supra note 33, at 286 n.404.
90. Robin West, The Anti-Empathic Turn, in PASSIONS AND EMOTIONS 243, 250 (James E.
Fleming ed., 2013).
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approach is premised on the importance of promoting the general
welfare.  But both models share the conviction that a focus on tangi-
ble, material stakes safeguards against the dangers of permitting
unelected judges to impose their own ideologies.  As West explains,
If we take seriously the inability to intersubjectively compare util-
ities, then it directly follows that empathy is both inadequate to the
task of learning enough of the subjective well-being of another so as
to increase social welfare . . . and unnecessary.  Revealed prefer-
ences are what we need to know . . . .91
This is because “[t]he individual’s preferences are best revealed
through his choices, and his choices are fully discoverable through the
empirical methods of the social sciences.”92
The anti-empathic turn that West describes is a turn toward a court
that takes absentees and the public at large into account, but it does so
using revealed preferences as a substitute for inquiry into actual
stakes and goals.  The private rights model also rejects inquiry into
individual hopes and aspirations.  It assumes that limiting jurisdiction
to those seeking to protect tangible assets is a way out of evaluating
subjective goals and values.  Both approaches assume, ultimately, that
the goals of individuals are unknowable, and they therefore assume
away a whole range of individual hopes and aspirations.  Both ap-
proaches are premised on an unsupported assumption that empathic
understanding is too subjective and unruly to be attempted, and that
revealed preferences are objectively ascertainable.  These are, of
course, value choices about the role of the federal courts and about
the goals of the general welfare, masquerading as neutral jurisdic-
tional principles.
The assumption that litigants in federal court are uniformly moti-
vated by the pursuit of material gain has led to all sorts of unfortunate
contortions and wrong turns in federal courts doctrine, and it has been
extensively and appropriately debunked.93  Judge Weinstein demon-
strates that a judge armed with empathy, concern, and curiosity can
learn quite a bit about litigants’ actual motivations—and that these
are often complicated and nuanced.  In the Franklin Lane High
School class action suit against the Board of Education on behalf of
students dismissed for disciplinary infractions,94 Judge Weinstein ar-
ranged for a questionnaire to be mailed to class members so he could
91. Id. at 277.
92. Id.
93. There is voluminous literature on this point. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 35; Tushnet,
supra note 35.
94. Knight v. Bd. of Ed., 48 F.R.D. 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), discussed in MORRIS, supra note 1, at
144–45.
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learn their concerns.95  He wanted to know how many class members
genuinely wanted to continue their educations.96  He also listened
carefully to the concerns of parents, teachers, and the principal, and to
the findings of a panel of educational experts.97  He learned that the
problem was complicated, and issued a remedy that reflected this
complexity.98
One of the best-known examples of Judge Weinstein’s empathy is
his understanding of the stakes for the Agent Orange plaintiffs.  He
talked of his meetings with the members of the class and the “con-
cerns that had repeatedly been voiced . . . including the need for infor-
mation on possible genetic damage to veterans and their children, and
the need for improvement of the Veteran’s Administration and its
hospitals.”99  He wrote,
Vietnam veterans and their families desperately want this suit to
demonstrate how they have been mistreated by the country they
love. They want it to give them the respect they have earned. They
want it to protect the public against future harm . . . . They want a
jury “once-and-for all” to demonstrate the connection between
Agent Orange and the physical, mental and emotional problems
from which many of them clearly do suffer.100
In short, he apprehended a complex blend of motives and goals, most
of then not reducible to material gain.
VI. MORAL IMAGINATION AND THE SCOPE OF
THE ARTICLE III CASE
Moral imagination is a term that does not lend itself to easy defini-
tion.  As used here, it shares some qualities with empathy.  The philos-
opher Mark Johnson describes moral imagination as involving self-
knowledge, including knowledge of our own limitations and blind
spots; knowledge of others, including others who do not share one’s
traditions; and the “ability to imagine and enact transformations in
our moral understanding.”101  The understanding of one’s own limited
perspective and the openness to other perspectives are qualities I have
discussed above.102  It is the last attribute—the ability to imagine and
enact transformation—that points toward moral imagination as it ap-
95. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 144.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 145.
98. See id. at 144–45.
99. Id. at 332.
100. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
101. MARK JOHNSON, MORAL IMAGINATION: IMPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE FOR ETH-
ICS 187 (1993).
102. See supra Part II.
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plies here.  I earlier quoted Lederach’s view that moral imagination is
a quality that “breaks out of what appear to be narrow, shortsighted,
or structurally determined dead ends.”103  In a lovely essay on moral
imagination in judging, Judge Leland Anderson describes a “different
sphere of understanding . . . where solutions other than the most ap-
parent emerge. This sphere invites acts of imagination, creativity, and
risk.”104
The use of creativity and imagination to “break out of structurally
determined dead ends” and the willingness to take risks to ensure that
justice is done are at the core of Judge Weinstein’s jurisprudence and
his legacy.  Risk-taking and creativity are never free of controversy,
and particularly not for a district court judge working in a profession
that views change with suspicion and in a role that is circumscribed by
reviewing courts, the political branches, and other constraints too nu-
merous to mention.
To conclude, I want to make two points about judging with moral
imagination. The first is that although such an approach to Article III
judging is highly visible and controversial, playing it safe and flying
below the radar is also an interpretive and ideological choice.  The
second is that moral imagination is not an inherently desirable attri-
bute.  That is, whether pushing or sometimes crossing boundaries is a
moral good depends on the moral vision underlying the acts—and in
the judicial context, on the moral qualities one brings to the bench.
As to the first point, it is a commonplace that Judge Weinstein tends
to test boundaries. Justice, for him, is an affirmative moral command.
Thus he has little patience for gatekeeping doctrines,105 or for many of
the other time-honored means of shifting, delaying, or disclaiming re-
sponsibility.  As I mentioned above, the acknowledgement of choice is
a precondition for moral imagination.106  Judges—particularly district
court judges—can reassure themselves that they do not have the
power to “make law.”  As Morris observes, Judge Weinstein finds
more gaps and ambiguities in law than other judges.107  As Alexander
Bickel observed long ago, there is quite a bit of play in the gatekeep-
ing doctrines for those who wish to take advantage of it.108  Whatever
one thinks of Bickel’s praise of judicial passivity, his practical message
103. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
104. Leland P. Anderson, Essay, A “More Excellent Way”: Moral Imagination & the Art of
Judging, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 399, 416–17 (2008).
105. MORRIS, supra note 1, at 112.
106. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
107. Id. at 96.
108. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40
(1961).
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is important: using gatekeeping doctrines to duck the issues is gener-
ally a choice, rather than a duty.109  Judge Weinstein’s commitment to
seeking out injustice in order to fix it is a different kind of choice.
The doctrine of separation of powers can be viewed as imposing a
duty not to act when the role is relegated to the political branches, or
as imposing the converse duty to ensure that the Constitution and fed-
eral law are obeyed when the political branches abdicate this task.
One influential theory about the scope of Article III power assumes
that the political branches are best positioned to address widely
shared injuries.110  In situations where this turns out not to be the
case, reliance on formalist notions of the relative competence of the
branches can leave serious injustices unaddressed—issues that life-
tenured judges may be in the best position to tackle.  One ideological
tack is to declare and adhere to the formal boundaries of the tripartite
system, irrespective of the actual workings of the political branches.  If
injustice falls through the cracks, it is purely a function of adherence
to the separation of powers.111  Cases such as the Mark Twain school
desegregation case,112 the Accu-Tek case on gun manufacturer liabil-
ity,113 and, of course, the Agent Orange litigation114 all concern politi-
cally delicate and potentially explosive situations in which the political
branches failed to step up.  Judge Weinstein adopts a more flexible
approach that takes into account whether the harms are in fact being
addressed.  He views “the judge’s role [as] a stopgap in the absence of
legislative action.”115  From his perspective, “it’s been an abdication of
legislative responsibility that has forced judges to take an active sub-
stantive and procedural role in these matters.”116
In short, Judge Weinstein’s approach is to acknowledge the possibil-
ity of choice and to choose to act affirmatively.  As he points out,
“[B]enign neglect is as illegal as malign intent. Both are unconstitu-
tional.”117 The mistake that is often made is to confuse inaction with
109. Id. at 79.
110. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Feder-
alism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000).
111. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop
the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
112. Hart v. Cmty. School Bd., 383 F. Supp 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
113. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 47 F. Supp. 2d 330 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
114. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
115. WEINSTEIN, supra note 9, at 104.
116. David Luban, Heroic Judging in an Antiheroic Age, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2064, 2089 (1997)
(quoting WEINSTEIN, supra note 9, at 104).
117. Hart v. Cmty. School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 755 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (The Mark Twain Junior
High School case).
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ideological neutrality or with lack of interpretive choice. But as
Martha Minow observed,
[L]aw, and judging, inevitably reveal and express the views of spe-
cific, real persons. . . . [C]onfining [judges] to established practices
and routines[ ] may offer some reassurance that the imposition of
force does not stem from only one person’s views. Yet, practices and
routines can work their own injustices, while still embodying the
views of some people.118
As several commentators have observed, the willingness to push or
transgress boundaries in service of a vision of justice are admirable
qualities in Judge Weinstein, but may not translate so well to other
jurists.119  Other aspects of moral imagination mitigate the danger in
cases like this—including respect for the dignity of others, the desire
to understand the perspectives of others, and the humility to recognize
one’s own limitations.  Even so, some of Judge Weinstein’s more con-
troversial actions have pushed the concept of interpretive leeway and
the boundaries of the separation of powers, at least to their outward
limit.  To choose one small but clear example, in the child pornogra-
phy case discussed earlier, the sentence Judge Weinstein imposed was
below the mandatory minimum required by the federal sentencing
guidelines.120  In his response to the Second Circuit’s reversal, he said
that even if he had exceeded his power, “at least the matter has been
brought to the government’s and public’s attention, so that in due
course, in our caring democracy, future injustices of this kind will be
avoided.”121  In the Agent Orange litigation, although Judge Weinstein
determined that the science didn’t support a viable cause of action, he
said he could not for that reason ignore “those cries from the heart for
justice.”122  Minow noted that what he accomplished via the settle-
ment was to spread the cost through the community, and she queried
whether this sort of use of the courts should be open to legislative
debate.123 As Stephen Burbank argued, these choices are least prob-
lematic when they are transparent and accompanied by reasons.124
They are also least problematic when they are reviewable.
By testing the boundaries in such circumstances, federal district
courts can incite and contribute to a reasoned debate about the rela-
118. Minow, supra note 78, at 2029 (footnotes omitted).
119. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 7, at 2007–09; Minow, supra note 78, at 2028.
120. United States v. C.R., 972 F. Supp. 2d 457 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
121. Id. at 458.
122. WEINSTEIN, supra note 9, at 11.
123. Minow, supra note 78, at 2022–23.
124. Burbank, supra note 7, at 1999.
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tionship between the courts and justice.125  District courts have a
unique contribution to make to such debates.  The district courts are
often viewed as severely constrained in their ability to move the law
forward.  Yet this portrayal underplays the unique role of district
courts.  To say that district courts “find facts” and have the best op-
portunity to observe demeanor is to fail to fully capture the affective
dimension of the proceeding.  In district courts, the “emotional and
psychological distance” between judge and litigants is at its minimum.
Abstract notions about litigants’ goals and motivations, about the con-
sequences of decision making, and about the role of the federal courts
in a democratic system, can be tested against concrete observation.
Empathy is essential to this endeavor, no matter how narrowly one
conceives the role of the judge.  Moral imagination is also necessary—
it is an acknowledgment that judges make choices, and that these
choices are rarely ideologically neutral.  Whether moral imagination is
desirable depends on whether one shares Judge Weinstein’s underly-
ing vision of the role of the federal courts in a democratic society.
125. See id. at 1982–84.
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